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Abstract
Many arid countries use an administrative water allocation mechanism. Quotas,
price discrimination, and increasing block tariﬀs are set and enforced by prohibiting
the resale of water. Critics of this mechanism argue that allocation is politicized,
subjective and slow to respond, and therefore misallocates water compared to a market
mechanism. However, an administrative mechanism also promotes social goals that
are not valued economically. In this paper, both positive and negative impacts of the
administrative allocation are explored, using a general equilibrium model and with
Israel as a case study. The model concludes that from 1995 to 2006, potable water
misallocation in Israel was relatively small, on average of 5.5 percent of the potable
water supply. The value of agricultural amenities is imputed at approximately 2.3
times agricultural output. At the margin, introducing a water market in Israel is not
recommended, i.e., net-social welfare would fall.
• Key Words: Secondary water market, Administrative water allocation, Agricultural amenities, Gen-
eral Equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Most arid and semi-arid regions use an administrative water allocation mechanism, whereby
the state monopolizes the water resource, and erects a regulatory body to administer it. The
main tools used are quotas, price discrimination, and increasing block tariﬀs that are set and
upheld by prohibiting the resale of water.1
Critics of this mechanism argue that allocation is subjective, politicized, and leads to
ineﬃciencies (Dinar et al., 1997; Holden and Thobani, 1996). Much of the criticism centers
on the agricultural sectors that have access to subsidized water, and farmers appear to have
historical, senior rights, and are shielded by a strong lobby. Therefore, even when ineﬃcien-
cies are detected, the political system ﬁnds it diﬃcult to change antiquated allotments.2 The
result is ineﬃcient use of water, whereby farmers grow low-value and surplus crops, while
non-agricultural water users struggle to develop expensive new supplies (Colby, 1990; Plaut,
2000). In addition, a 'black' water market may form, which further indicates that water is
misallocated (Lichtman, 2009).
These arguments are partly justiﬁed, but as discussed by Just et al. (1997), the goal
behind an administrative allocation is to promote social objectives, such as water and food
security, or equitable consumption across income groups or climate speciﬁc regions. Admin-
istrative mechanisms are also used to correct market-failures in situations of public goods,
where an amenity provides non-marketed services, e.g., agricultural landscape, tourism, her-
itage, etc. The multifunctionality of agriculture activities may produce beneﬁts over and
above the market value of agricultural production (Brunstad et al., 1999, 2005).
In this paper, I explore both positive and negative impacts of an administrative water
allocation using Israel as a case study. The following questions are addressed: (1) Can the
level of administrative misallocation be measured? (2) Who are the main ineﬃcient water
users, and how can allocation be improved? (3) What value do the amenities need to have
in order to rationalize the current administrative allocation as eﬃcient? (4) Finally, which
is preferable, a market or an administrative mechanism?
To answer these questions, an applied general equilibrium model is developed and applied
to Israel from 1995 to 2006. In the initial case, a regulator decides on a framework in
which price discrimination, quotas, and increasing block tariﬀs are set, and water trade
is prohibited. Water users decide on the amount of water to buy within this framework.
Subsequently, in the counter-factual experiments, water trade is enabled within a secondary
water market and prices adjust until markets clear. The model is furthermore extended
1For discussion on various countries, see review by OECD (2010), and by Diakité et al. (2009), Ruijs
(2008), Roseta-Palma and Monteiro (2008) and Hajispyrou et al. (2002).
2For a further discussion and summary for Israel, see extended Appendix A.
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to account for the non-economic value of amenities; the agricultural sectors internalize the
beneﬁt of producing amenities that are demanded by the households.
If we consider the market allocation to be eﬃcient, the quantity of water traded would
indicate the level of administrative misallocation. For example, a large secondary water
market would indicate that the administrative mechanism is ineﬃcient, and that a market
mechanism would put water to better use. However, if the social value provided by the
administrative mechanism is also included, it is then possible that the beneﬁts from a water
market could be smaller than the loss incurred to social value, i.e., a net-social welfare loss.
At the parametrization stage of the model, under plausible assumptions, the approach
was to select values that would naturally lead to the largest possible water misallocation.
These results, therefore, are conservative, upper bound, estimates of the potential secondary
water market for Israel. Nevertheless, the results ﬁnd that the administrative misallocation
is rather small and suggest that a market mechanism is not arguably better, at the margin.
When the model is extended to include amenities, a water market is clearly undesirable. On
the one hand, trade puts water to better use and raises economic welfare. But on the other
hand, when trading away water quotas, agricultural output falls and reduces the positive
externalities from the amenities. This lowers overall social welfare.
The paper makes the following contributions. First, it adds a new perspective into the
discussion of water allocation eﬃciency in Israel. Contrary to most literature on Israel, the
paper supports the continued use of an administrative water allocation mechanism. Second,
it suggests a simple method, which can be used to evaluate and improve water allocation
decisions also in other countries. Finally, the paper imputes the value of agricultural ameni-
ties in Israel, adding to the discussion by Fleischer and Tsur (2009); Kan et al. (2009) on the
economic value of agricultural amenities. Thus, the paper relates to two areas of research.
It has relevance for natural resource management that aims to improve the eﬃcient use of a
scarce resource, and it has implications for political and social policy.
The paper is structured as follows: Section two introduces a simpliﬁed theoretical model,
and shows how ineﬃcient water allocation arises from an administrative mechanism. Section
three expands to a more realistic multi-sector applied general equilibrium model for the
Israeli economy. Section four discusses the empirical results. Section ﬁve extends the model
to impute the value of the agricultural amenities and overturns the results from the previous
section. Finally, section six concludes.
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Figure 1: Water Quotas With Two Agents
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Note: Total water W¯ is allocated by the government. Household is allocated water quantity W gov , while farmers are allocated
W¯ −W gov . Area aob is the dead weight loss from ineﬃcient water allocation. The potential secondary water market is the
volume |W gov −W ∗|, a proxy for ineﬃciency.
2 The Water Model
Applied general equilibrium models have been developed to analyze diﬀerent issues within
water management (see Dixon, 1990; Berck et al., 1991; Seung et al., 2000; Diao et al., 2008).
Diao and Roe (2003) speciﬁcally discuss administrative water allocation in Morocco, and ﬁnd
that reducing protectionist agricultural policy without correcting for distortions in irrigated
agriculture pricing will lead to increased ineﬃcient water use. Creating a water market,
however, could compensate for the decline in farmers' proﬁts and raise eﬃciency. Gómez
et al. (2004) demonstrate that having a water market in the Balearic Islands, rather than an
administrative mechanism, leads to economics gains that would allow for delays in investment
in desalination plants. Becker (1995) focuses on the Israeli agricultural sector, and uses a
linear programming model to analyze the eﬀects of introducing a market mechanism on the
shadow water prices for the various water basins, and also reports the economic gains from
a water market.
The common theme in the above papers, is that a market mechanism leads to economic
gains. However, they do not include the social consequences of introducing a water market.
In this paper, social gains are an additional dimension to the administrative mechanism.
The usual beneﬁts of a market are illustrated in Figure 1. Assume a closed economy
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with only two water users. The total water resource is quantity W¯ , and a social planner
allocates W gov to the household, and W¯ −W gov to the farmer. Furthermore, water trade is
prohibited. However, this allocation is clearly not optimal, because the marginal values of
water are not equalized, MVWh > MVWi.
When water trade is enabled, the household beneﬁts from buying additional units of
water, while the farmer beneﬁts from selling some of his water rights. The discrepancy
between the initial administrative allocation and the market allocation is the horizontal
distance |W gov −W ∗|, measured in cubic meters of water. The quantity traded within this
secondary water market is used as a proxy to indicate the level of ineﬃcient allocation.3
2.1 A simpliﬁed trade model with water inputs
To describe the model used in this paper, consider a simpliﬁed closed economy. Firm i ∈ N
produces a single ﬁnal good Yi ∈ y, using a diﬀerentiable constant returns to scale production
function fi (Li,Wi) that uses labor and water inputs, respectively. Output prices and wages
are pi, pL ∈ p, respectively.
One representative household h ∈ H has a rational and locally non-satiated preference
relation, with a continuous utility function U (y). He consumes ﬁnal goods Yi, and water
Wh ∈ y, and is endowed with a ﬁxed supply of labor L¯ and water W¯ .
The government, which is not explicitly modeled, holds the property rights of water, and
assigns a diﬀerent increasing block tariﬀ (IBT) for each type of water user, i.e., ﬁrms and
households pay pW,i, pW,h ∈ p, respectively. However, unlike in the paper by Diao and Roe
(2003), water users are not bound by the water quota allotted to them. They can, in general,
obtain as much water as they desire by paying increasingly higher prices, within the IBT
framework.
Given the above, ∀i, the ﬁrm's proﬁt maximization problem is to choose labor and water
demands, Li and Wi, so as
Max
Li,Wi≥0
pii (Li,Wi) = pifi (Li,Wi)− pLLi − pW,iWi (1)
The household's disposable income is M = pLL¯ + pW,hW¯h +
∑N
i pW,iW¯i, which includes
income from wages and water charge fees, that are collected by the water authority and
transferred to the household. W¯i and W¯h denote the administrative water allocation.4
The household's utility maximization problem is to choose consumption of goods and
3See further discussion in Appendix A.4.
4Note that in the initial administrative allocation, Wh = W¯h, and could be netted out from both the
household's income equation and utility maximization problem. However, they are intentionally there for
clarity because when water trade is enabled, it is possible that Wh 6= W¯h.
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water, Yi and Wh, so as to
Max
Yi,Wh≥0
U (Yi, · · · , YN ,Wh) s.t. M ≥
N∑
i
piYi + pW,hWh (2)
Focusing on water, the ﬁrst order conditions must be satisﬁed so that the marginal value
of water (MVW ) equals the real water price.
MVWi =
∂fi (·)
∂Wi
≤ pW,i
pi
⊥ Wi ≥ 0, ∀i (3)
MVWh =
∂U (·)
∂Wh
≤ pW,h
pU
⊥ Wh ≥ 0 (4)
Following Mathiesen (1985); Rutherford (1995, 1999), we set up an ArrowDebreu equi-
librium as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). Three types of weak inequality condi-
tions must be satisﬁed: (i) zero proﬁt, (ii) market clearance, and (iii) income balance, each
associated with three non-negative variables, i.e., y∗ ≥ 0, p∗ ≥ 0 and M∗ ≥ 0, respectively.
Using Shephard's lemma and deﬁning the unit cost function as ci = Ci (pL, pW,i, Yi = 1)
and household's unit expenditure function as e = E (pi, pW,h, U = 1), the demands for inputs
by the producers, and demand for ﬁnal goods and water by the household, are all summarized
in the following weak inequalities, ∀i:
Zero proﬁt conditions: 0 ≤ ci − pi ⊥ Yi ≥ 0 (5)
0 ≤ e− pU ⊥ U ≥ 0 (6)
Market clearing conditions: 0 ≤ Yi − ∂e
∂pi
· U ⊥ pi ≥ 0 (7)
0 ≤ W¯h − ∂e
∂pW,h
· U ⊥ pW,h ≥ 0 (8)
0 ≤ U − M
pU
⊥ pU ≥ 0 (9)
0 ≤ L¯−
N∑
i=1
∂ci
∂pL
· Yi ⊥ pL ≥ 0 (10)
0 ≤ W¯i − ∂ci
∂pW,i
· Yi ⊥ pW,i ≥ 0 (11)
Income balance: M = pLL¯+ pW,hW¯h +
N∑
i=1
pW,iW¯i ⊥ M ≥ 0 (12)
where price vector p∗ and activity levels y∗ constitute a competitive equilibrium.
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2.2 Secondary water market
As described through Figure 1 and Equations (3) and (4), assume that at the initial admin-
istrative allocation with restricted water trade, pW,i
pi
= MVWi < MVWh =
pW,h
pU
, i.e., the
household has a higher marginal value of water than ﬁrm i. When water trade is allowed,
the household would prefer to buy water from ﬁrm i (and the ﬁrm prefers to sell), up to a
point where MVWi = MVWh.
More generally, water users can be buyers or sellers, and havingM = N+H water users5
leads toM2 trade conﬁgurations, with ψmn being the relative marginal value. If user m ∈M
is a buyer, and user n ∈ M is a seller, a possible trade channel is when MVWm
MVWn
= ψmn > 1.
Otherwise, it cannot be a possible trade channel.
MVWm
MVWn
=
ψmn > 1 possible trade channelψmn ≤ 1 not possible (13)
These conditions, therefore, limit the number of conﬁgurations to only T = M(M−1)
2
possible
trade channels, with t ∈ T being a speciﬁc channel (Section 3.4 discusses how the marginal
values of water are estimated with Table 3 a concrete example).
Thus, when water trade is enabled, the units of water, γt, that are transferred between
seller n and buyer m are measured by
0 ≤ γt ⊥ pW,n,t − (1− ) pW,m,t ≥ 0, ∀t (14)
with pW,n,t and pW,m,t being the water market prices for the seller and buyer, respectively. For
computational purposes,  → 0 is a small number to 'help' the solver with slack activities,
thus avoiding the problem of inﬁnite solutions, i.e., a degenerate model.6
There are various combinations (scenarios) of activating and deactivating water trade
channels, e.g., activating each channel separately, or all together. Therefore, each of the t ∈ T
channels has a binary action (designed by the scenario); active or not-active, {A,NA} ∈
Action. There are {tA, tNA} ∈ T channels, {iA, iNA} ∈ N ﬁrms, and {hA, hNA} ∈ H
households, that are active or not-active, respectively.7
Finally, for a set of actions, the market clearing conditions (8) and (11) are replaced with
5N ﬁrms and H households.
6This insures that when multiple t channels are opened (active), only net transfers of water is considered.
For example, a case of inﬁnite solutions is when a ﬁrst user sells to the second, the second sells to the third,
but the ﬁrst also sells to the third. By adding , the solutions is limited to one (possible) case where, for
example, the ﬁrst sells to the second and to the third, while deactivating the second selling to the third.
7In other words, a water user will not trade because it is either a choice or it is blocked.
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0 ≤ W¯A − ∂eA
∂pW,hA
· UA +
∑
iA
∂ciA
∂pw,iA
· YiA ⊥ pW = pW,hA = pW,iA ≥ 0 (15)
0 ≤ W¯iNA −
∂ciNA
∂pW,iNA
· YiNA ⊥ pW,iNA ≥ 0 (16)
0 ≤ W¯hNA −
∂eNA
∂pW,hNA
· UNA ⊥ pW,hNA ≥ 0 (17)
Equation (15) states that the supply of traded water, W¯A, will equal the demand for
traded water, provided that water prices equalize within the secondary water market. Equa-
tions (16) and (17) reﬂect cases in which some water users are prohibited from trade, and
have user-speciﬁc water prices and quotas.8 Appendix B provides the full analytical model.
3 The applied general equilibrium model and the data
In order to adequately represent the actual empirical Israeli economy, the general equilibrium
model that was discussed in the previous section is extended. The following will describe
the main features of the applied model and of the data used.9
Table 1 presents key water ﬁgures for 2006. Roughly 68% of the total supply of water in
Israel is potable water, of which there are four main users. Approximately 39% of potable
water is consumed by agricultural sectors, 6% by manufacturing sectors, 16% by service
sectors, and 39% by private households.10
The use of non-potable water, i.e., salinized, contaminated, sewage euents, ﬂood, brack-
ish water etc., has increased in the past two decades, due to growing pressures on the supply
of water, and improvements in technology and infrastructure. Approximately 95% of it is
used by the agricultural sector, and the rest by the manufacturing sectors.
The applied small open economy is aggregated into three main production sectors: agri-
cultural, manufacturing and services, and one representative household. The government is
not explicitly modeled, but its actions are manifested through the initial water allocation,
i.e., quota and increasing block tariﬀ (IBT) assignments to water users.
8Here, there is only one representative household. Equation (17) is a case where the household is blocked
from trading, and therefore ∂eA∂pW,hA
·UA = 0 in Equation (15). Extending the analysis to multiple-households
is a simple matter, e.g., updating Equations (2) and (12), but requires further assumptions regarding water
ownership in the applied model. Adding the government explicitly, would probably be required.
9Programmed and simulated in GAMS using Rutherford (1999)'s MPSGE.
10Water consumption by private households and service sectors is regarded as residential water consump-
tion. Yearly data is reported by the Israeli Water and Sewage Authority by eleven sub-groups. Approximately
55% of total potable water is consumed by residential users of which 71% are private homes, and the rest
are service sector, i.e., commercial and public oﬃce buildings, swimming pools, gardens, etc.
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Table 1: Key Water Figures in Israel (2006)
Potable Water Non-Potable Water
User Mil.
Cubic
Metersa
% of
Total
Expenditure
(Current
Mil. NIS)b
Marginal
Value
Waterc
Mil.
Cubic
Metersa
% of
Total
Expenditure
(Current
Mil. NIS)b
Agriculture 519 39 768 1.48 589 95 474
Manufacturing 84 6 209 2.49 30 5 24
Services 213 16 833 5.15
Household 524 39 1,889 4.85
Total 1,341 100% 619 100%
% Total Water 68% 32%
Source: a The Water and Sewage Authority, Israel. b Own Calculation: water quantity times relevant price band. c From the
water authority's 2006 price plan, with assumptions discussed in Section 3.4.
3.1 Production
Each of the three production sectors uses the following ﬁve inputs: labor, capital, interme-
diate goods, potable water, and non-potable water.11 The production function is setup as
a four-level nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structure, which simpliﬁes the
calibration procedure and captures the diﬀerent substitution elasticities for pairs of inputs.
Some of the main assumptions are the following.
First, the model is calibrated for a short-to-medium time horizon, which aﬀects the
assumptions that are made on factor mobility. Within a time frame of 3 to 4 years, land
inputs are relatively rigid because of soil type, location, infrastructure, legislative constraints,
and other reasons (Hertel, 2002). Here, because capital includes land, capital is also highly
rigid, and is assigned as a sector speciﬁc input. This is especially true for the agricultural
sectors.
Second, in order to capture the user speciﬁc characteristics of water, sector speciﬁc
output-supply-price elasticities and water-demand-price elasticities are used to calibrate for
the unknown substitution elasticities. These are summarized in Table 2, which are the mid-
values from empirical papers. Agricultural sectors have a relatively inelastic supply price
elasticity of 0.8, partly due to high land rigidity. Non-agricultural sectors have an elastic
supply price elasticity of 3.0. Furthermore, both agricultural and manufacturing sectors have
a water demand price elasticity of -0.7, while the residential water demand price elasticity is
-0.1, i.e., service sectors and households.12 As in many applied models, intermediate inputs
11Service sectors have zero expenditure on non-potable water.
12Appendix C and D provide a detailed description of the empirical literature and assumptions behind
these values, and explain the calibration method from the known elasticities and cost share to the unknown
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Table 2: Output-supply-price and demand-price elasticities
Output
Supply
Elasticitya
Water
Demand
Elasticitya
Potable/Non-
Potable
Substitutionb
Agricultural 0.8 -0.7 1.1
Manufacturing 3.0 -0.7 1.1
Services 3.0 -0.1
Household -0.1
Source: a Approximate mid-values reported in various papers. b Israel Water Authority
Note: The above values, together with the cost share from the social accounting matrix, calibrate sectors' and household's input
substitution elasticities (see appendix).
are assumed to enter in ﬁxed proportions (Leontief technology). Finally, the substitution
elasticity between potable and non-potable water is assumed to be 1.1.13
Third, labor inputs freely migrate between the various sectors, and have a global wage
level, pL. Finally, in the benchmark, water inputs are allotted to users and are non-tradable,
and water prices, pW,i, are sector speciﬁc. As discussed in Section 2.2, when water-trade
is allowed, water is reassigned as a global input, and trade occurs until the market clears.
Water prices change suﬃciently to drive water marginal values to equalize between users.
3.2 Household
The small open economy has one representative household that is endowed with labor, cap-
ital, and water resources, L¯, K¯, W¯ , respectively. Tax revenues are transferred to the house-
hold, including positive (negative) transfers of income to cover balance of payments, bop.
Income is
M = PW,hW¯h +
n∑
i=1
(
PLL¯i + PK,iK¯i + PW,p,iW¯p,i + PW,np,iW¯np,i + τi + bopi
)
(18)
and utility is derived by consuming potable water and ﬁnal goods, using a two-level nest CES-
Cobb Dougals function. Table 2 reports that the residential water demand price elasticity
is -0.1, and with it I calibrate the unknown substitution elasticities between the demand for
water and for other ﬁnal goods.
substitution elasticities within the production and utility functions.
13Water Authority assumes a substitution ranging from 1 to 1.2 between potable and non-potable water
for agricultural use, depending on the water quality of non-potable water.
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3.3 General assumptions in the model
Two assumptions are made in the model. First, in order to properly compare the welfare
eﬀects between the benchmark and the counter-factual scenarios, and because this is a static
model, the balance of payments (BOP) is ﬁxed to the year speciﬁc levels. Otherwise, it
would not make sense to allow for policy experiments to increase the trade deﬁcit and thus
increase welfare, at the expense of foreign borrowing. Such a situation would be misleading
because in a fully dynamic model, borrowing will have to be paid back at some point.14
Second, having increasing block tariﬀs usually means that higher block tariﬀ users sub-
sidize lower block tariﬀ users. Here, however, the model is simpliﬁed by aggregating many
diﬀerent users to only four main groups, each with a uniform price. Thus, this assumption
could be interpreted as if all users within a group have the same size and preferences, or as
if they have already traded water internally between themselves. Dis-aggregating users into
further sub-groups is possible, but would require a more detailed social accounting matrix.
3.4 Data and marginal value of water
The data is obtained from the Use-Supply tables published by the Central Bureau of Statis-
tics (CBS) Israel for 1995, 2000, 2004, 2005 and 2006. It includes sectors output and inputs,
household consumption and trade balance, as well as levels of taxes and subsidies. From
these, social accounting matrices (SAM) were constructed and used to calibrate the model.
Similar data for 2007 is not yet available. Labor inputs are obtained from CBS Israel's
Compensation of Employees by Industry tables.
The water authority assigns increasing block tariﬀ (IBT), whereby consumers pay pro-
gressively higher prices for each increasing quantity of water consumed.15 Each main user,
i.e., agricultural, manufacturing, services, and households, has a diﬀerent IBT structure.16
CBS Israel does not report the water sector separately from the electricity sector, and
does not distinguish between potable and non-potable water. Therefore, the expenditure
on water had to be estimated by other means, rather than directly from the Use-Supply
tables. Residential water expenditure, i.e., household and service sectors, were estimated by
summing the total water quantity times the relevant tariﬀ band for each type of residential
user.17 Agricultural water expenditure is obtained by multiplying the quantity of total
14Practically, to ﬁx the BOP to its benchmark level, household is endowed with a ﬁxed amount of bopi for
each type of good i ∈ N .
15But not necessarily higher, e.g., manufacturing has a lower price for water use above the 100% quota.
16Data obtained from the Water Authority and summarized in Appendix E.2.
17Detailed data on eleven residential sub-groups is reported by the Water Authority, Residential Water
Consumption (a yearly publication in Hebrew).
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potable water supply by tariﬀ block A. Likewise for manufacturing, the quantity of water is
multiplied by the main water tariﬀ block. A similar method was used for non-potable water,
which has only one price band.
Water users can obtain as much, or as little, water as they are willing to pay-for. This
means that their marginal value of water (MVW) is equal, or somewhere below the next tariﬀ
block, of the last unit of water. Table 1 summarizes the total monetary expenditure on water,
and the estimated marginal value for 2006. Recall that conservative values are preferred,
which would increase water trade, e.g., by lowering MVW for farmers and a increasing for
households. The underlying assumptions for the marginal value of water are the following.
Agricultural water quotas were revised in 1989 with the following tariﬀ blocks. Tariﬀ A
is charged up-to 50% of the quota, tariﬀ B between 50-80%, and tariﬀ C between 80%-100%.
There are two further bands above 100% with lower prices.18 Since 1989, extensive cuts in
potable water quotas were made, and most of agricultural users pay tariﬀ A, which is thus
assigned as there marginal value for water.19
Manufacturing sectors have one main tariﬀ up to 100% of the quota, and this is assigned
as the marginal value of water.20
Diﬀerent service sectors are assigned diﬀerent tariﬀs. For example, hospitals and Mikves21
fall under tariﬀ A. Hotels fall under tariﬀ B, while the rest of the service sectors fall under
tariﬀ C, i.e., commerce, education, sport, public, etc. Public gardens are charged tariﬀ D.
In the model, tariﬀ C is used as the marginal value of water for service sectors, because
it captured 62% of the water used. Public gardens consumed around 25% of water in the
service sector, but they do not account for GDP.
Finally, the household price scheme for 2006 included four tariﬀ blocks. Tariﬀ B cap-
tured around 61% of the total consumed water by households, and therefore chosen as the
household's estimated marginal value of water.22
Table 3 is an applied example of the discussion in Section 2.2. It shows that having four
main water users in Israel leads to sixteen water trade conﬁgurations. In order to obtain the
relative marginal value of water (MVW) for a buyer/seller ψmn, as in Equation (13), divide
the marginal values of water for each pair of users reported in Table 1. Values greater than
18There are two further blocks. The ﬁrst is up-to 10% above the quota, and the second is for above 10%
above the quota. See Appendix E.2 for further detail.
19From a discussion with the Water Authority. Agricultural water consumption is not published, as it is
done with residential consumption. Furthermore, the secondary water market would be smaller if tariﬀ B
would have been chosen. When in doubt, the larger, more conservative, secondary water market is preferred.
20There is also a lower water charge above 100% of the quota. See Table 11 for further details.
21Jewish Ritual Bath.
22In 1997, band B captured 70% of the total household water. Source: Israeli Water Authority, Residential
Water Consumption (in Hebrew). In 2010, the price bands were changed. However, since the model's data
covers until 2006, the eﬀects of this new price band is left for future research.
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Table 3: Water trade channels: relative MVW for 2006
Buyer m ∈M
Agricultural Manufacturing Services Household
Agricultural 1 1.684 3.484 3.283
Seller n ∈M Manufacturing 0.594 1 2.069 1.949
Service 0.287 0.483 1 0.942
Household 0.305 0.513 1.061 1
Note: These are the ratio of seller/buyer water marginal value. Divide values from the ﬁfth column in Table 1 and numbers in
bold are the possible water trade channels.
one indicate which water trade channels are possible, and who are the sellers and buyers.
The six possible channels are marked in bold in Table 3. Service sectors, for example, value
water by approximately 3.484 times that of agricultural sectors. Therefore, service sectors
would be buyers from the agricultural sectors, but cannot be sellers.
4 Measuring the eﬃciency of an administrative water allocation
In this section of the applied model, water is initially allotted administratively to each of
the four users, and water trade is forbidden. Then, in the counter-factual experiments, trade
is allowed and water inputs are re-shued until all users have the same marginal value of
water.
Compared to a market allocation, a certain degree of administrative misallocation is ex-
pected. The real question is, therefore, how large is the potential secondary water market
likely to be? For example, a large misallocation could indicate a poor administrative mech-
anism, which would clearly be something to worry about. Such a result could indicate that
a market mechanism may be superior.
If, however, the misallocation is rather small, then it is unclear which mechanism is better.
The model, therefore, is extended to include the non-marketed economic value. Together,
this section and the next contribute to a better assessment of the most preferable mechanism
for Israel.
4.1 Results for 2006
The main results, which include the size of the secondary potable water market, the welfare
gains, and their eﬀect on the nominal water price are reported in Table 4.23
The most important result is the all-channel-trade scenario, in which the secondary
23Detailed results and the GAMS/MPSGE model are available from the author upon request.
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Table 4: Model Results (2006, % change)
Welfare % Change in water prices
Water* % of total gains Potable water Non-potable
Channel (seller to buyer) MCM potable NIS mill. Agri. Indus. Serv. House water
1. Agriculture to Manufacturing 32.7 2.4 21.5 8.0 -35.9 1.1
2. Agriculture to Services 20.7 1.5 24.9 5.0 -69.8 1.2
3. Agriculture to Household 44.5 3.3 51.0 11.5 -66.0 2.6
4. Manufacturing to Services 9.5 0.7 5.7 17.5 -43.2 0.3
5. Manufacturing to Household 15.5 1.2 8.2 31.9 -32.3 0.6
6. Household to Services 0.7 0.1 0.1 -4.1 1.8 0.0
All Channel Trade 80.8 6.0 86.3 22.6 -27.2 -64.8 -62.7 4.4
(of which)
Manufacturing buys 22.5 1.7
Services buys 17.9 1.3
Household buys 40.3 3.0
Shadow Water Price (All Channel) 1.81 NIS/CM
*Total Potable Supplied, in 2006, was 1340.5 Million Cubic Meters (MCM).
Note: Model's results for 2006 data. The second column is the quantity of water traded within each channel of the secondary
water market. The third column is the percent of water traded of the total potable water supply in that year. The fourth
column are the welfare gains in New Israeli Shekels (NIS) Million. The right hand section is percent change of nominal water
price from the initial allocation.
potable water market is estimated at 80.8 million cubic meters (MCM). This is approxi-
mately 6.0% of the total potable water consumption in Israel in 2006. Agricultural sectors
re-allocate potable water towards manufacturing sectors, that buy an additional 22.5 MCM
of water, beyond their initial consumption within an administrative mechanism. Service
sectors buy an additional 17.9 MCM, and households buy 40.3 MCM.
Because the water authority practices price discrimination, the secondary water market
clears when nominal water prices rise (or fall) suﬃciently to allow the marginal value of
water to equalize for all users (reported in the right hand side of Table 4). In the all-trade
scenario, agricultural water price rises by 22.6%, and falls for manufacturing, services, and
households by 27.2%, 64.8%, and 62.7%, respectively. This would mean that in 2006, the
market clearing nominal water price (shadow price) would have been NIS/MC 1.81.
Being a general equilibrium model, water trade also aﬀects other variables in the economy
such as production levels, sector speciﬁc return to capital, wage level and welfare. Table 5
reports the most important of them. These changes might seem small, but are a result of
potable water inputs being only 2% of total input cost in the agricultural sectors, and less
than 0.1% for manufacturing and service sectors. Household expenditure on potable water
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Table 5: Other Key Results (2006, % Change)
Agriculture Manufacturing
Channel Prod. Price Return on Capital Prod. Price Return on Capital
3. Agr sell to Hh -0.2 0.4 0.13 -0.024 0.14 0.13
All Trade -0.4 0.7 0.13 -0.04 0.15 0.14
Services Other Variables
Prod. Price Return on Capital Wage Water Sector GDP Price Non-Potable
3. Agr sell to Hh -0.01 0.13 0.13 0.13 1.4 2.6
All Trade 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.27 2.3 4.4
Note: Model output for 2006 - continued from Table 4. Values are percent change from the initial allocation.
is only 0.2% of disposable income.24 Therefore, the household utility level (welfare) rises by
only 0.01%. This is, however, equivalent to a 2.3% increase in economic value relative to the
size of the water sector, and approximately New Israeli Shekels (NIS) 86.3 Million in 2006
prices (see fourth column in Table 4). The intuition behind these results is that by allowing
for water trade, water inputs are put to better use, and the economy's production possibility
frontier moves outwards.
To better understand the mechanism within a general equilibrium model, it is useful to
focus, for example, on channel 3 in Table 4 and Table 5, where agricultural sectors sell only
to households. In this channel, which has the largest impact on water trade, the size of
the water transfer is around 44.5 MCM. Relative to the initial administrative prices, market
water prices rise by 11.5% for the agricultural sectors, and fall by 66% for the household (see
Table 4 channel 3).
As Table 5 reports, agricultural output falls by 0.2%, which raises agricultural prices by
0.4% and raises agricultural return on capital by 0.13%. As mentioned earlier, capital is a
sector speciﬁc input, and will not have a direct eﬀect on the rest of the economy. However,
when water inputs are transferred to households, this raises demand for labor within the
agricultural sectors, and leads to a wage increase across the whole economy. Indirectly, this
raises the cost of production in the other two sectors, even though they are not involved in
the water market. Production levels, therefore, fall in the manufacturing and service sectors,
and output prices rise.
24CBS Israel reports that household water consumption is approximately 1% of disposable income. This,
however, includes all elements of water such as sewage cost, recycling, etc. In this model, these additional
costs are attributed to capital inputs rather than water, because they are not directly related to water trade.
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4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis was performed on each sector using minimum and maximum parameters
for the various output supply elasticities, and water demand elasticities (summarized in
Table 6). These parameters are well above and below the accepted values that are reported
and used in other studies. The results suggest that the model is well-behaved, and that the
main results are robust.
Output supply price elasticity has a negligible eﬀect on the size of the water market
because, as mentioned previously, water accounts for a very small fraction of the input cost
in production. Furthermore, capital is a sector speciﬁc input, which dampens the eﬀect
of parameter changes. Experimenting also with capital as a fully tradable input does not
change the size of the secondary water market by any measure worth reporting.
A larger eﬀect on the secondary water market comes from changing the water demand
elasticities. Using unlikely, extreme, values for both agriculture and manufacturing sectors,
the potential secondary water market reaches a range of 3.6% to 7.8% of the total potable
water supplied. Yet, the outcomes are not far-oﬀ from the main result of 6%. Changing
the water demand elasticities for residential users, i.e., service sectors and households, by an
unlikely order of magnitude of 10, changes the range to 4% to 18% of total potable water.
Again, these are unlikely elasticities, but do not change the overall message described in the
previous section.
Finally, stretching the water demand elasticities so that agricultural and manufacturing
sectors are -1, and service sectors and household are -0.4, would increase the secondary water
market to 198 MCM, which is 14.8% of total potable water supply.
The model is also tested with diﬀerent marginal values of water. Because agricultural
sectors are the main sellers of water, raising their water marginal value to the next price
block, decreases the water market to 4.8% of total potable supply, and the nominal water
shadow price rises to 2.05 NIS/CM. This outcome is not surprising, since the seller will sell
less when his marginal value of water rises.25
Increasing the marginal value of water for the buyers, such as households and service
sectors, either separately or jointly, will also not change the overall result but rather reallocate
water diﬀerently between them. This is because at the top tariﬀ blocks, both users have the
same prices. Furthermore, the marginal value chosen for residential water users are already
on the high-side, because the water price paid at the 'city gates' are lower than the actual
price paid by ﬁnal users. Thus, reducing their marginal value of water would have only
reduced the secondary water markets.
25Since manufacturing has one price block, no sensitivity test was conducted on its marginal value of water.
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Table 6: Values used for Sensitivity Analysis, 2006
Output Supply Elast. Water Demand Elast.
Sector Min Model Max Min Model Max
Agriculture 0.4 0.8 1.2 -0.1 -0.7 -2
Manufacturing 1 3 5 -0.1 -0.7 -2
Services 1 3 5 -0.01 -0.1 -1
Household -0.01 -0.1 -1
Note: Max. and min. range for supply-price and demand-price elasticities. Bold numbers are the benchmark values.
In conclusion, besides conﬁrming the validity of the model, the sensitivity analysis pro-
vides another important message. It shows that even when the deep parameters are some-
what imprecise, the size of the secondary water market is in the vicinity of 6% of the total
potable water supplied (80 MCM in 2006). This is a rather small misallocation, and its
signiﬁcance will be discussed shortly. Furthermore, the results are mostly sensitive to the
choice of the marginal values of water, which are harder to estimate. In this model, however,
the idea was to capture the largest size of ineﬃciency possible, under plausible assump-
tions. Thus, increasing the marginal value of water for the agricultural sectors, the sellers,
or lowering it for residential user, the buyers, would have only reduced the misallocation.
4.3 Comparing results for 1995 through 2006
The applied model is also calibrated for 1995 through 2006, for the years that CBS Israel
had available data. Marginal values for water are re-assigned according to the relevant water
prices chosen by the water authority at each year.26 Using the year speciﬁc SAM, and the
water demand-price elasticities and output-supply-price elasticities as reported in Table 2,
the substitution elasticities are re-calibrated as discussed in Section 3.1. New water trade
channels are set as in Section 3.4, i.e., each year has its own values for Table 3.
The main results are summarized in the top section of Table 7, and conclude that the
potential secondary potable-water market, for those years, would have been consistently
around 5% to 6% of the total supplied potable water. The bottom section of Table 7 reports
the changes to water price, relative to the initial administrative allocation, and the shadow
water price.
At ﬁrst, two results seem counter-intuitive, and are used to show how water authorities
could use this kind of model to improve allocation eﬃciency. First, for 1995, the model
26The water authority updated water prices according to a water index or due to administrative reform.
The water index is based on the changes to the consumer price index, electricity prices and average wage
levels. See extended Appendix E.2 for further details.
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Table 7: Secondary Water Markets for 1995-2006
Potable Water (Million Cubic Meters, MCM) Non-Potable (MCM)
Year Total 2nd Water Market % of Total Total Nominal Price
Change (%)
1995 1574.7 79.2 5.0 406.5 3.5
2000 1481.4 98.2 6.6 442.3 4.6
2004 1359.0 84.3 6.2 595.3 5.0
2005 1344.1 79.8 5.9 617.3 4.1
2006 1340.5 80.8 6.0 618.5 4.4
Nominal Change in Potable Water Price (%) Shadow Water
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Services Households Price (NIS/CM)
1995 13.4 -20.0 -76.1 -74.3 0.88
2000 20.8 -29.4 -73.6 -71.6 1.13
2004 22.5 -29.4 -66.4 -64.2 1.61
2005 21.2 -28.4 -63.8 -61.5 1.77
2006 22.6 -27.2 -64.8 -62.7 1.81
Note: Top section of Table 7, columns three and four, show the (potential) quantity of a secondary potable water market since
1995. Bottom section shows the percent change to potable water price from the initial allocation, and sixth column is the
shadow price of potable water in nominal New Israeli Shekels (NIS) per cubic meter.
estimates that the potential secondary potable water market would have been the smallest,
compared to the other years in the data (5.0% of total potable water). This is an indication
of a high eﬃcient allocation. Curiously, in that year, the supplied potable water was also the
largest, 1575 MCM. Since agricultural sectors were portrayed as ineﬃcient, water guzzlers
in Israel, one would think that when the supply of potable water is large, there is more room
for waste. The question is then, why was 1995 the most eﬃcient year?
The reason is that in 1995, the infrastructure of non-potable water was at its infancy,
and agricultural sectors were unable to substitute with lower quality water. Table 8 reports
Table 8: Potable water expenditure as % of total cost (net of tax)
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Households
1995 5.7 0.08 0.14 0.3
2000 2.5 0.031 0.12 0.2
2004 2.3 0.034 0.11 0.2
2005 2.2 0.034 0.11 0.2
2006 2.0 0.031 0.11 0.2
Note: from the social accounting matrix.
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that the expenditure on potable water as a percent of total input cost, was twice as high in
1995 as compared to later years. Therefore, potable water were an essential input in those
years.
The second counter-intuitive result is that the highest ineﬃcient allocation (at 6.6%
of total potable water supplied) was measured in the year 2000, in the midst of a water
crisis in Israel. During the dry winters of 1998/9 through 2001/2, the water authority had
cumulatively reduced agricultural potable water by approximately 40%, which were never
returned in later years. Thus, by eliminating quotas, one should expect a more eﬃcient
allocation.
However, by 2000, new infrastructure and technologies that improved non-potable quality,
enabled agricultural sectors to substitute potable water consumption with non-potable water,
as illustrated in Figure 2. This meant that the expenditure on potable water dropped from
5.7% to a 2.5% of total cost on inputs (see Table 8), releasing excess potable water.
Furthermore, between 1995 and 2000, the water authority had reformed the water pricing
scheme, disfavoring manufacturing sectors. While residential nominal water prices (house-
holds and service sectors) rose by approximately 16.5%, and for agricultural sectors by 20.7%,
the manufacturing sectors had an increase of 45.7% in nominal water price.27 The model
captures the fact that manufacturing sectors would have liked to purchase more water from
agricultural sectors, thus enlarging the potential secondary water market.
4.4 Policy implications
The policy implications, so far, are the following: First, water authorities across the world
can use this method to estimate the level of allocation eﬃciency both within the current
price-quota framework and for future proposed reforms. For example, the major reforms in
Israel, between 1998 and 2001, though meant to deal with the serious water shortage of the
time, were actually damaging and led to even more ineﬃcient allocation. Furthermore, the
latest pricing reforms in 2010, were not suﬃciently evaluated.
Second, recalling that the results are meant as conservative, upper-bound, estimates of
the secondary water market, I ﬁnd that the administrative misallocation between 1995 to
2006 is on the average of 85 MCM. In other words, by not introducing a water market, Israel
incurs an economic loss of around NIS 86 Million (in 2006 prices). This looks rather small,
considering that it amounts to half the production of a desalination plant; It suggests that
a market mechanism might not perform much better.
Finally, up until now, only the economic costs of an administrative mechanism were
27Source: Water Authority water price data. This type of pricing change was due to an administrative
reform, rather than a change to the water price index. See Table 11 in extended Appendix E.2.
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Figure 2: Potable Water Consumption by Main Users (MCM)
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Source: The Water and Sewage Authority, Israel.
Note: During the drought between winters 1998/9 through 2001/2, agricultural water quantities were reduced by 40%. This
coincided with a rise in agricultural consumption of non-potable water. Water consumption by manufacturing sectors and
residential users (per-capita) were fairly consistent. Roughly with population growth, residential water consumption rises by
2.3% per year (on average).
considered. By imputing some of the social value generated by the social planner, the next
section compares the lost economic value from misallocation with the gains generated by
maintaining the administrative mechanism.
5 Estimating the value of agricultural amenities
Typically, incomplete markets (or no markets at all, as in our case) are characterized by
distortions and welfare losses. However, when amenities are involved, it is possible to ratio-
nalize this distortion as a corrective measure for sectors which create positive amenities that
are not valued economically. For example, in addition to producing marketed goods, agri-
cultural sectors also provide environmental amenities such as agricultural landscape, clean
air, tourism, heritage preservation and other cultural elements that characterizes a country's
self-narrative.28
The positive eﬀects of agricultural amenities have been studied by various authors, e.g.,
Drake (1992); Bowker and Didychuk (1994); Bergstrom et al. (1985); Brunstad et al. (1999);
Fleischer and Tsur (2003, 2009); Kan et al. (2009) and others. These studies use micro-level
28For example, the farming community in Israel is viewed as the forefathers of the Zionist movement
who had built the state of Israel, and thus gives them an intrinsic cultural value.
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Algorithm 1 Imputing the amenity value
1. An arbitrary amenity value is chosen and taxed at 100% tax.
2. As in Section 4, compute size of water trade in a secondary water market.
3. Reduce tax on amenity to 0%, and re-compute size of the secondary water market.
4. Increase (decrease) amenity value and repeat (3) until the size of the secondary water
market is null.
data to impute the value of agricultural amenities in a partial equilibrium setting. This
paper, however, uses the general equilibrium model developed in the previous sections to
impute the value of agriculture amenity under a multifunctional agricultural sector, more
resembling Peterson et al. (2002).
It is assumed that in addition to the privately traded commodities, agricultural sectors
also provide an amenity, which they are not rewarded for producing. A regulator, however,
recognizes this distortion and uses administrative water allocation to correct for it. The
imputed value, in this extension, characterizes the amenity value which would rationalize
the administrative water allocation as being eﬃcient. Therefore, assuming the amenity
value would have been accounted for in the ﬁrst place, even with the possibility of water
trade, water users would choose not to trade.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the method by which the amenity value is imputed. Using a
ﬁxed proportion transformation function,
Yagr = min
{
Y cagr
a
,
Y ncagr
b
}
(19)
agricultural sectors are now assumed to jointly produce two types of goods; a privately
traded commodity Y cagr, e.g., apples, and a non-commodity Y
nc
agr, i.e. an amenity good such
as landscape and heritage. Both goods are demanded by the representative household, but
by initially setting a 100% tax rate on the non-commodity, and transferring the tax revenue
directly to the households, the household pays for the commodity, but not for the non-
commodity. In such a way, the household consume the amenity free of charge, i.e., its price
is zero. As long as the amenity tax rate is maintained at 100%, any arbitrary amenity value
used in the data-set has no bearing on the water trade results, reported in Section 4.
Next, the amenity tax rate is reduced to 0%, and the size of secondary water market is
re-computed. The model iteratively increases (decreases) the amenity value until a value is
found that leads to zero water trade, even when trade is possible.
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Table 9: Agriculture Amenity Value (2006)
Channel Amenity Valuea As % of
Agriculture
outputb
As % of
total
outputb
Amenity value
lost from a
water marketa
Net-social welfare
lost from a water
marketa
(2006 Million NIS) (2006 Million NIS)
1. Manufacturing buy 26,000 68 1.7 -28.7 -68.4
2. Services buy 53,500 139 3.5 -61.8 -69.4
3. Households buy 87,250 227 5.7 -165.6 -104.7
6. All Channel Trade 87,250 227 5.7 -321.5 -215.0
*Source: a Model Result. b In 2006, agricultural economic output was NIS 38.5 Billion, and total country output was NIS
1,542.1 Billion. Source: Israel CBS and used in the SAM.
Note: The second column is the amenity value that rationalizes an eﬃcient administrative allocation. The third and fourth
columns are the size of the amenity value as a percent of the agricultural output and total output. The ﬁfth column is the direct
amenity value lost, and column six is the overall net-social welfare lost, from introducing a water market with the imputed
amenity value included in a re-calibrated SAM. The diﬀerence between them are the welfare beneﬁts from a water market.
Table 9 summarizes the imputed agricultural amenity value for the main channels, and for
the all-trade channel scenario, for 2006. The conclusion is that it amounts to approximately
NIS 87.3 billion. This is roughly 2.3 times the value of the agricultural economic output,
and equivalent to 5.7% the total country's economic output. Similarly, it is equivalent to
70% of the total agricultural social output, i.e., economic output plus amenity.
This is not to say that this value is the true value of the amenity, but rather that it
indicates the amenity value which would rationalize the administrative allocation as being
eﬃcient given the preferences used. With a lack of information, the amenity enters a Cobb-
Douglas utility consumption bundle with other goods. Hanemann (1991), in a related paper,
discussed cases where public goods are readily substitutable for public goods, and others
where they are not. At an aggregate level, it seems less realistic that the former is true for
Israel. Therefore, reducing the substitution elasticity with other goods would only increase
the imputed amenity level.
Furthermore and unsurprisingly, re-doing the analysis as in Section 4, but with a re-
calibrated social accounting matrix (SAM) that accounts for the imputed amenity value
from Table 9, all the main water market results are exactly the same as previously reported,
i.e., water quantities and prices, and changes to production are the same. Recall that
production sectors do not internalize any beneﬁts from producing an amenity. Therefore, it
does not matter what the amenity value is.
However, what is diﬀerent is the analysis of welfare. In this extension, the household
utility function also includes a demand for amenities. When agricultural production falls,
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so does the amenity level proportionately. This, therefore, leads to a loss of amenity value
worth NIS 321.5 million.29 Yet, introducing a water market does improve the use of water
inputs, raising welfare by NIS 106.5 million (similar to the result reported in Table 4).30
Overall, this is a net-social welfare loss of NIS 215 million (see Table 9), which is translated
as a 0.024% fall in utility level.
To gauge whether the value of the imputed agricultural amenity is plausible in an Israeli
context, I compare with Kan et al. (2009) who use micro-level Israeli data to investigate
the potential economic beneﬁts of changing intra-agricultural land allocation among crops,
while taking into account both proﬁtability and amenity contribution. Their study is based
on work by Fleischer and Tsur (2009), who estimate crop speciﬁc amenity-value function in
an Israeli rural-urban land allocation setup. Kan et al. (2009) conclude that in Israel, the
agricultural amenity value is roughly 33% of the total agricultural social output.31
Comparing their results to mine, the order of magnitude is rather similar, though my
results are higher for the following reason. First, my analysis uses all agricultural sectors,
while Kan et al. (2009) focus on vegitative agriculture only, which accounts for approximately
64% of total agricultural output. It would be possible to compare more closely my results
with theirs by further dis-aggregating agricultural sectors.
Second, Kan et al. (2009) analyze only the northern regions because vegitative agriculture
is predominately located in the wetter north of Israel, and not in the arid south. In my paper,
however, agriculture is analyzed country-wide. Since both northern and southern farmers
pay the same rates for water inputs, including southern farming in the analysis increases
signiﬁcantly the amenity value of agriculture as a whole.
Finally, it should be emphasized, again, that the agricultural amenity estimated here is
not the amenity value per se, but rather the value which would rationalize the administra-
tive water allocation as being eﬃcient. This is diﬀerent from Kan et al. (2009)'s approach
who estimate the amenity value by comparing a proﬁt maximizing function to its regional
Pareto eﬃciency function. In my case, the amenity value consists of all elements of amenity,
including cultural and heritage aspects. Though tough measures have been imposed on the
Israeli public to conserve water, the administrative mechanism continues to operate in its
present form. This suggests that the public has internalized the value of the amenity rather
than overturning it.
29As before in Table 5 of Section 4, agricultural production drops again by −0.37%. Due to the Leontief
transformation, amenity drops by −0.37% · 87, 250 = −321.5.
30Without considering amenities, Table 4 reported that a water market raises welfare by NIS 86.3 million.
31In Kan et al. (2009) Table 2, this is referred as total net-social beneﬁts to remind the reader that total
social beneﬁts includes both the production proﬁts and the amenity value, and I therefore do the same.
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5.1 Policy implication
The main policy implication for the Israeli case is that if an environmental amenity of NIS
87.3 billion is present, introducing a water market will not necessarily increase welfare, but
may actually reduce it. Some points to consider are the following.
First, we can roughly impute a lower bound amenity value, by combining Kan et al.
(2009)'s results with this model, which would lead to a smaller amenity loss of around NIS
46.8 million.32 Overall, the net-social welfare gains will be small, if the beneﬁts from a water
market are around NIS 80 to 100 million, as found in this paper. However, recalling that the
aim has been to compute a conservative, upper-bound estimate, this means that the beneﬁts
from a water market could be even smaller.
Second, if the average yearly misallocated water is approximately 85 million cubic meters
of water, this amounts to around half the production of a desalination plant.33 Einav (2009)
reports that the investment cost is somewhere in the range of half to one billion NIS. If
the saved welfare loss is around NIS 215 million every 3 to 4 years, within a few years, a
desalination plant therefore would be a better sustainable alternative to a water market.34
Finally, this paper has only focused on agricultural amenities and does not include ameni-
ties created by other sectors, e.g., public and private gardens, world heritage sites, etc.35
These are overlooked because the method implemented here cannot be used to compute
them. Residential users have higher marginal values of water making them natural buyers
of water. If it was possible to reward them for producing the amenity, as it was done with
agricultural sectors, they would demand even more water. In this case, Algorithm 1 has
no bound. Because the administrative allocation supposedly accounts for all amenities, the
inframarginal social-welfare loss from introducing a water market could be even higher.
6 Conclusions
In Israel, parliamentary investigative committees and researchers from the natural and social
sciences have concluded that for decades, the administrative water allocation mechanism has
32An over-the-envelope calculation of the following: multiply the 2006 agricultural production level, NIS
38,497 million, by Kan et al. (2009)'s ratios of amenity to beneﬁt, 33%. This very rough imputed amenity
value will be NIS 12,704 million. Then, the fall in agricultural production, -0.37%, would lead to a loss of
NIS 46.8 Mill in amenity value.
33Or in the vicinity of importing water from Turkey, under discussions between the two countries.
34Recall that 3 to 4 years is the short-to-medium run time-frame of the model.
35Recall that from Section 3.4, garden water consumption is around 25% of total residential. Furthermore,
the amenity value of world heritage sites are unknown. For example, since 2000, the Jordan river has been
dammed at the southern tip of the Sea of Galilee. The water trickling downstream is recycled water for
touristic purposes. No water from the Jordan river is reaching the Dead Sea, which will eventually dry up.
The irreversible environmental and historical implications are not measured here.
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mismanaged water allocation. Underfunding of desalination plants, and over subsidizing of
the agricultural sectors, had led to a severe hydrological deﬁcit. Yet, the administrative allo-
cation is crucial because it adds social beneﬁts, which are diﬃcult to evaluate economically.
By developing an applied general equilibrium model, this paper set out to evaluate these
positive and negative aspects. The model compared the administrative mechanism with a
simulated market mechanism, and concluded that between 1995 to 2006, a conservative,
upper-bound, average of 85 million cubic meters of potable water were misallocated yearly,
roughly 5% to 6% of the total annual supplied potable water. In monetary terms, this
amounted to an economic loss of between NIS 80 to 100 million (in 2006 prices).
However, neglecting non-commodity considerations led to a partial understanding of the
costs and beneﬁts to welfare. An administrative mechanism also promotes social agendas,
which are not considered within a market mechanism. For example, they protect agricul-
tural amenities, which are non-commodities that farmers produce but are not rewarded for
producing. In the extension of the model, the value of the agricultural amenity was imputed
at around 2.3 times its commodity economic output. If a water market would be intro-
duced, the social value lost could be around NIS 320 million. Overall, this is a net-social
loss of NIS 215 million. These ﬁndings, therefore, supported the continued use of the water
administrative mechanism in Israel.
Finally, because my conclusions apply to the short-to-medium run water situation, there
are still limitations to the analysis . As Diao and Roe (2003) discuss, having a water market
can eventually make water similar to any other traded commodity. It can motivate agents to
search for better technology to increase water supply (e.g., private and government collection
of runoﬀ water, desalinization of seawater, and recycling sewage water) for resale into the
market for proﬁt. The long-run potential gains from a market mechanism are not fully
quantiﬁed in this short-to-medium run analysis, and further research is therefore necessary.
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Extended appendix
A Water Policy in Israel
A.1 An overview of Israel's water policy
Menahem (1998), Becker and Lavee (2002) and others, have extensively discussed the his-
torical development of water policy in Israel, which they divide into three sub-periods. In
the ﬁrst period, 1948-67, water sources and institutional frameworks were developed and the
government pro-actively used administrative water allocation to supplement money trans-
fers, promote settlement and food-security policies, and to subsidize agricultural and various
manufacturing sectors.
In 1959, the Water Law was enacted as a legal framework for the control and protection
of Israel's water resources. It states that all sources of water in Israel are public property
and a person's land rights do not confer rights to any water sources running through or
under his land. Every person is entitled to use water, as long as that use does not cause
the salination or depletion of the water resource. For egalitarian reasons, all users far from
the water source pay the same price as those close to it. Finally, the Water Law forbids the
resale of water quotas, which disconnects market forces from the pricing and allocation of
water.
The second period is considered to be 1967-90, in which agricultural expansion was
prioritized over water resource conservation. Water management responded re-actively to
seasonal rainfall variation, or to changes in the political environment. For example, during a
drought, water quotas were sharply reduced, targeting ﬁrst the agricultural sectors. Water
quotas were returned to previous levels when rainfall was plentiful again.
Finally, the third period, from 1990 to present day, is characterized as a gradual paradigm
shift, moving away from a reactive water management style, towards a more proactive ap-
proach. But changes have been slow, and over 40 years of excessive consumption, above
the natural rate of replenishment, has led to severe hydrological deﬁcits, which permanently
threatens water quality.
A.2 A recent historical account of the hydrological situation and policy results
Between the winters of 1995/6 to 1998/9, rainfall was below the average of 1400 million cubic
meters (MCM). In 1998, the Israeli government oﬃcially declared a "water crisis", which had
continued on, and had peaked in winter 2001/2.
In 1997, the Arlozoroﬀ Committee was formed to suggests policy reforms to deal with
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the water crisis. The conclusions, however, were not fully accepted, and included the
following: economic incentives should be used to bring about a diversion of potable water
away from agricultural sectors towards residential consumption. Farmers who, as a result,
would suﬀer losses should be initially compensated. Agricultural water prices should be
raised by 80% over several years, under the assumption that an 8% increase in price would
result in a reduction of 4% to 5% of the quantity of agricultural water consumption. Finally,
investment in desalination plants must begin immediately.
In 2001, as a result of the prolonged drought, the Israeli government re-evaluated the
water crisis, and formed a Parliamentary Inquiry Committee to investigate its causes, and
to suggest key reforms. The ﬁndings were presented in 2002. Some of the key conclusions
were to establish an independent, professional water authority. Encourage and attract water
professionals, such as water engineers, hydrologists, economists, and other water resource
management professionals, to enter the water sector. Reduce bureaucracy and enhance the
development of reclamation plants. Finally, invest in desalination plants and return natural
resources to above the hydraulic 'Red Lines' by 2005, and then continue with sustainable
water management (Drayzin, 2002, Magen, 2002).
In 2008, the State Comptroller Committee received a report that analyzed how many of
the 2002 Parliamentary Inquiry Committee's conclusions were actually implemented. This
report warned that the available water supply continued to be in deﬁcit, and that only
some of the lessons learned from the 2001 water crisis were actually implemented, e.g.,
the construction of desalination plants had been delayed by a around ﬁve years, because
the plentiful rainfall of winter 2002/3 had allowed policy makers to divert attention to more
urgent budgetary needs (Davidovich, 2008, Tal, 2008).
Since winter 2008/9 through winter 2010/11, another cluster of low yearly rainfall have
lead the government to declare another water crisis. Once again, water allotments were
reduced from agricultural sectors and several manufacturing sectors. Residential users were
urged, through public awareness programs, to conserve water, and were limited and penalized
from watering gardens. The water pricing framework was, once more, re-considered and
revised.
A.3 Criticism of the administrative allocation in Israel
Plaut (2000) critically summarizes Israel's administrative mechanism, and discusses why
it is harmful, and produces waste and misallocation. He adds that the current system
motivates farmers to use all the allotted yearly water, in order to justify and preserve their
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water allotments for the next year, even if it means dumping it.36 This type of behavior
resembles other settings, e.g., government ministries and bodies, sub-divisions within large
ﬁrms, etc, that use-up all resources before the budgetary-year ends. Furthermore, Lichtman
(2009) reports illegal, shady, and inequitable water activities in Israel's farming sector, and
estimates that a black water market operates at around 10 million cubic meters (MCM)
yearly, i.e., equivalent to a small desalination plant.
One can argue that this on-going water crisis is a result of mismanagement. Water
supply and demand do not balance, and the administrative mechanism is unable to adjust
water allocation eﬃciently and quickly. Introducing tradable water permits, however, would
enable market forces to internalize the true value of the resource. Both sellers and buyers
would gain from trade, regardless of whether the permits are auctioned or allocated free-of-
charge (Becker, 1995; Holden and Thobani, 1996).
Alternative water allocation mechanisms have been discussed by many researchers in
Israel and abroad. Dinar et al. (1997), Holden and Thobani (1996) and Livingston (1995) give
a general review of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of alternative mechanisms.
Becker and Zeitouni (1998), Fishelson (1994), Moore (1994), Zeitouni et al. (1994) discuss
alternative mechanisms within the Israeli context, and Bielsa and Duarte (2001), Calatrava
and Garrido (2005), Garrido (2007), Pujol et al. (2006), Simon and Anderson (1990) discuss
for other countries outside of Israel.
A.4 Ineﬃcient administrative water allocation
Changing established allocation mechanisms is politically diﬃcult, slow, and even too costly
to justify a change. If the administrative allocation is not too ineﬃcient, a better strat-
egy might be to improve allocation within the current mechanism. Otherwise, if it is very
ineﬃcient, an alternative mechanisms might be better. Figure 3 illustrates why the polit-
ical environment may make it diﬃcult to change an established administrative allocation
mechanism.37
Recall that misallocation is deﬁned as the quantity of water (in cubic meters) that would
be transferred from one user to the other, after water quotas and prices are set by the social
planner. In other words, if the potential secondary water market is large, it could indicate
that the initial administrative allocation is ineﬃcient, and users prefer to re-shue water
between them. Note, however, that non-economic value are not considered here, and that
36Also, American environmentalists had criticized water policy in California's Central Valley for decades,
arguing that it causes serious environmental damages. Farmers were sold water at prices far below its
resource value, and they had simply dumped huge amounts of it on desert ﬁelds (Plaut, 2000). Recall, that
also much of Israel is arid.
37Becker (1995) uses a similar example .
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Figure 3: Water Quotas With Two Agents
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Note: Total water W¯ is allocated by the government. User 1 is allocated water quantity W gov , while user 2 is allocated
W¯ −W gov . Area bod is the dead weight loss from ineﬃcient water allocation. The potential secondary water market is the
volume |W ∗ −W gov |, a proxy for ineﬃciency.
the market mechanism is deﬁned as the most optimal.
Assume a closed economy with only two water users. The total water resource is quantity
W¯ , and the social planner allocates W gov to user 1, and the rest W¯ − W gov to user 2.
Furthermore, water trade is prohibited. However, this allocation is clearly not optimal,
because the marginal values of water are not equalized between users. User 1 would beneﬁt
from buying some of user 2's water rights, while user 2 would also beneﬁt from selling-oﬀ
some of his water rights. Overall, the economy suﬀers a dead weight loss equal to area bod.
Furthermore, because the social planner also sets water prices, when it is set below the
market price, two possibilities arise. At level P1, user 1 has an excess demand for water, and
user 2 has an excess supply. At level P2, both users have excess demands.
In this model, misallocation is deﬁned as the absolute horizontal distance |W ∗ −W gov|
measured in cubic meters of water. Thus, ineﬃciency rises when the discrepancy between
the initial allocation and the market allocation rises. Now assume that the water authority
wants to reduce the ineﬃciency. To do so, it must raise the water price from P2 to P ∗,
and adjust water quotas to point W ∗. This would bring an overall beneﬁt to the economy.
However, without compensation, some users will be worse oﬀ, which will incentivize them to
block this change, even at the cost of it being welfare improving.
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For example, user 1's initial consumer surplus is area abeP2, and user 2's consumer
surplus is area fdeh. When price and quotas are re-adjusted to the optimal P ∗ and Y ∗, user
1's consumer surplus changes to area aoP ∗, which may (or may-not) be an improvement,
depending on whether additional area boc is greater (or smaller) than the reduction in area
P ∗cep2. On the other hand, user 2's consumer surplus is unambiguously reduced to area
fog. Thus, eﬃciency is increased, but at the cost for some.
Furthermore, there are two additional considerations. First, user 2 will be willing to spend
area godeh to block these changes. He will loss this area anyway, if the change occurs without
compensation. Regarding user 1, this is again unclear, because his gain (or loss) from the
re-adjustment is ambiguous. Second, assuming that the re-adjustment had occurred, since
user 2 most likely would have invested area godeh to block the change, this could lead to an
overall welfare loss. Again, user 1's case is ambiguous. The conclusion is that even though
a regime shift could allocate water correctly, it might be unwarranted, because the total
non-recoupable costs are greater than the economic gains from area bod.
Thus, an administrative allocation may become a method to re-distribute income. Var-
ious pressure groups struggle to maintain their historical allocations, which intensiﬁes even
further during severe water shortages and subsequent water quotas cuts (Plaut, 2000; and
as reported in the media). In addition, since new mechanisms cannot be tested, politicians
often prefer to hold-on to the mechanisms already in place, rather than risk an overhaul,
only to discover later that it might be worse oﬀ.
A.5 A water market as one alternative to an administration mechanism
One alternative to an administrative mechanism could be a water market, which is relatively
new in some regions such as Chile, Australia and the USA. In other regions, like Spain and
India, water markets have been traditionally functioning for years.38
When initializing a new water market, there are four possible methods for allocating
entitlements: (1) Random access; (2) Administrative rules based upon eligibility criteria; (3)
Historical allotments; and (4) Auctions.
These methods have been used in diﬀerent countries. Both auction and random access
(also called lotteries) have been frequently used in allocating hunting permits for big game.
However, they have also been used in water markets. Random access are more common in
allocating permits among residents, while auctions are more common for allocating permits
to nonresidents. The most widely used method for initializing a new water market has been
the historical approach, which is also known as ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst served or grandfathered.
38See discussion and case studies by Bhatia et al. (1995); Holden and Thobani (1996); Dinar et al. (1997);
Grafton et al. (2010).
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Some of the reasons for its popularity are the following. As discussed in the section
A.4, when users are initially (historically) allotted water and then allowed to trade, they are
better-oﬀ. Therefore, they would be less likely to oppose a new water market, compared to
other methods.
Furthermore, historical allotments recognizes the fact that previous water consumers
had invested in resource extraction and infrastructure, and it would serve to protect those
investments. Finally, empirical evidence suggests that using historical allocation leads to
smaller ﬁnancial burden on water users; Permit expenditure, which is the auction revenue
collected by the government, is typically higher than the extraction costs, which are the real
production costs for water. An auction method, therefore, could create opposition to change,
while historical allocation would be accepted, and thus raises the chances for policy to be
implemented (Lyon, 1982; Tietenberg, 2002).
Some general ideas for the institutional framework of a water market are the following.
Water could be resold or rented by users, and water permits would be exchanged with
minimal transaction costs. The new Water Authority would redeﬁne its duties and would
receive a status similar to a Central Bank, becoming a separate entity from the political
arena. As water levels drop, salt water and other minerals inﬁltrate the aquifers and water
basins, and deteriorate water quality; Consequently, the Water Authority could aim for a
predetermined water quality level, by controlling for the available water supply after the
rainy season, resembling the Central Bank that aims for a predetermined inﬂation target,
by controlling the money supply.
If equal burden of risk is preferred, than allotments would be proportional. After the
yearly supply of available water is determined, users would receive their proportional share,
though actual quantities vary. The new Water Authority would monitor and enforce correct
permit consumption, and impose a penalty on those who illegally extract excessive amounts
of water.
Holders of water rights would also be owners of their waste-water. Entrepreneurs could
collect waste-water and resale it back into the water market for proﬁt. Other agents could
invest in desalination plants or import water from other countries, and sell them in the water
market for proﬁt. Finally, the water market would develop a temporal forward market, in
conjunction to spot contracts.
B A full description of the applied model
Following Section 2.1, the applied model is extended in the following way. The water model
is a static general equilibrium model. For the speciﬁc Israeli case, production is aggregated
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into three main sectors: agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors. Each of them
uses labor, capital, potable and non-potable water, and intermediate goods as inputs in
production. There is one representative household, which derives utility by consuming water
and ﬁnal goods. Finally, government is not explicitly modeled, but its actions are manifested
through the initial water allocation. Tax revenue from production is directly transferred to
the representative household.
Water is initially allotted to each of the four users, and water trade is not possible. Then,
when trade is allowed, water inputs are re-shued until all users have the same marginal
water value.
Following Mathiesen (1985); Rutherford (1995, 1999), we set up an ArrowDebreu equi-
librium as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). A complementarity constraint enforces
that two variables are complementary to each other; i.e., that the following conditions hold
for scalar variables x and y: x·y = 0, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0. This condition is compactly expressed
as 0 ≤ x ⊥ y ≥ 0. Intuitively, a complementarity constraint is a way to model a constraint
that is combinatorial in nature since, for example, either x or y must be 0 (or both may be
0 as well).
In a general equilibrium setting, three types of weak inequality conditions must be sat-
isﬁed: (i) zero proﬁt, (ii) market clearance, and (iii) income balance, each associated with
three non-negative variables, i.e., y∗ ≥ 0, p∗ ≥ 0 and M∗ ≥ 0, respectively.
B.1 Production Structure
Production has a four-level structure, which simpliﬁes the calibration procedure and captures
the diﬀerent substitution elasticities for pairs of inputs. Section 3.4 and Appendix C.1 explain
the assumptions and calibration method in further detail, while the following points should
be noted. First, because capital incorporates land, it is assigned as a sector speciﬁc input.
In the short-to-medium term, soil type, location, infrastructure, legislative constraints etc.,
make land rigid. It becomes convenient to place inputs which cannot migrate between sectors
in the top level of production, and use the output supply elasticity, found in empirical papers,
to calibrate for the substitution elasticity.
Second, in the initial allocation, water inputs are allotted to users and are non-tradable.
They are, initially, sector speciﬁc with pW,i as there water prices. Placing water in the
third level, enables me to calibrate substitution elasticities using water demand elasticities,
which are readily available in empirical papers. However, when water-trade is allowed, it
is reassigned as a global input. Trade continues until the market clears, and water prices
change suﬃciently to drive water marginal values to equalize between users.
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Figure 4: The Production Function
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Note: Production is a four level nested function. The lowest level combines potable and non-potable water into an aggregate
water. The third level combines the aggregated water and labor inputs. In the second level, intermediate goods are combined
with the water-labor aggregate. Finally, in the top level, capital is aggregated with the intermediate goods-water-labor aggregate.
Finally, labor inputs freely migrate between the various sectors, and have a global wage
level, pL.
Figure 4 illustrates production Yi for i ∈ z (discrete) ﬁnal goods, and with j as i's alias. It
has a four-level nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structure. In the lowest level,
potable water, Wp,i, and non-potable water, Wnp,i, are combined to form a water aggregator
Wi. In the third level, water Wi and labor Li inputs are combined to form an aggregator
WLi. In the second level, intermediate inputs INj,i∈z are combined with the aggregatorWLi
to form the aggregator NWLi. Finally in the top level, capital Ki is combined with NWLi
to form the output Yi.
Beginning with the top level, the implicit function theorem equates proﬁt maximization
with cost minimization, which takes the form:
min
Ki,NWLi
pK,iKi + pNWL,iNWLi
s.t. Yi = A1,i
[
αiK
ρ1,i
i + (1− αi)NWLρ1,ii
] 1
ρ1,i
σ1,i is the substitution elasticity within the CES production function. pK,i is the return
on capital, pNWL,i is the price index for the aggregator. αi deﬁnes the CES share parameters,
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and ρi is the CES exponent. Note that it is related to the substitution elasticity via σi = 11−ρi
where σi ≥ 0. Finally, Ai,1 is the level of technology.
Solving the minimization problem, and for simpliﬁcation, reassigning the share param-
eters to incorporate the substitution elasticity using the relationship, aK,i = (αi)
σ1,i and
aNWL,i = (1− αi)σ1,i , yields the following input demand equations:
0 ≤ pK,i ⊥ Ki ≥ aK,i
A
1−σ1,i
1,i
[
(1− τi) pconsY,i
pK,i
]σ1,i
Yi
0 ≤ pNWL,i ⊥ NWLi ≥ aNWL,i
A
1−σ1,i
1,i
[
(1− τi) pconsY,i
pNWL,i
]σ1,i
Yi
with zero proﬁt conditions denoting pY,i and pconsY,i as the producer and consumer price indexes
for sector i, respectively.
pconsY,i ≤
1
Ai (1− τi)
[
αK,ip
1−σ1,i
K,i + αNWL,ip
1−σ1,i
NWL,i
] 1
1−σ1,i ⊥ Yi ≥ 0
pY,i = (1− τi) pconsY,i
At the second level, we assume the aggregate NWLi has a ﬁxed proportions share
of intermediate goods INji, and a water-labor sub-aggregate WLi. The following is the
optimization problem:
min
WLi,Nji
pWL,iWLi +
z∑
j=1
pY,ijINji
s.t. NWLi = min
[
WLi
aWL,i
,
INji
aIN,ji
, . . . ,
INzi
aIN,zi
]
Solving this minimization problem yields the following demand equations and price index
0 ≤ pWL,i ⊥ WLi ≥ aWL,iNWLi
0 ≤ pY,i ⊥ INji ≥ aIN,jiNWLi
with price index
pNWL,i ≤ aNWL,ipWL,i +
n∑
j=1
aIN,jipY,i ⊥ NWLi ≥ 0
At the third level, a water aggregator Wi and labor Li inputs are aggregated into WLi,
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where σ3,i is the substitution elasticity. The optimization problem is to
min
Wi,Li
pW,iWi + pLLi
s.t. WLi = A3,i
[
αWL,iW
ρ3,i
i + (1− αWL,i)Lρ3,ii
] 1
ρ3,i
and the solution yields the following equations:
0 ≤ pW,i ⊥ Wi ≥ aW,i
A
1−σ3,i
3,i
[
pWL,i
pW,i
]σ3,i
WLi
0 ≤ pL ⊥ Li ≥ aL,i
A
1−σ3,i
3,i
[
pWL,i
pL
]σ3,i
WLi
with price index
pWL,i ≤ 1
A3,i
[
αW,ip
1−σ3,i
W,i + αL,ip
1−σ3,i
L
] 1
1−σ3,i ⊥ WLi ≥ 0
Note that labor can migrate freely between all production sectors, and therefore has an
economy-wide wage rate.
At the fourth level, potable water, Wp,i and non-potable water Wp,i inputs are aggre-
gated into W i, where σ4,i is the substitution elasticity. The optimization problem is:
min
Wp,i,Wnp,i
pW,,p,iWp,i + pW,np,iWnp,i
s.t. W i = A4,i
[
αW,p,iW
ρ4,i
i + (1− αW,p,i)Lρ4,ii
] 1
ρ4,i
and the solution yields the following equations:
0 ≤ pW,p,i ⊥ Wp,i ≥ aW,p,i
A
1−σ4,i
4,i
[
pW,i
pW,p,i
]σ4,i
W i
0 ≤ pW,np ⊥ Wnp,i ≥ aW,np,i
A
1−σ4,i
4,i
[
pW,i
pW,np
]σ3,i
W i
pW,i ≤ 1
A4,i
[
αW,p,ip
1−σ4,i
W,p,i + αW,np,ip
1−σ4,i
W,np,i
] 1
1−σ4,i ⊥ Wi ≥ 0
Note that non-potable water can migrate freely between all production sectors, and there-
fore has an economy-wide price. At the margin, this will increase the possible secondary
water market for potable water.
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Figure 5: Household Utility
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Note: Utility is a two level nested function. The lowest level combines all ﬁnal goods into an aggregate. In the top level, water
input is combined with the ﬁnal goods aggregate.
B.2 Household Utility Structure
The small open economy has one representative household, h ∈ H, that is endowed with
labor, capital, and water resources. She receives tax revenue, and transfers positive (negative)
value of income to cover balance of payments. Thus, the disposable household income is:
M = PW,hWh +
z∑
i=1
(
PLLi + PK,iKi + PW,p,iWp,i + PW,np,iWnp,i + p
cons
Y,i τi + bopi
)
Extending this model for multiple households is a simple matter, but would then require
assumptions regarding water ownership. In such a case, the above income equation would
need to be revised. However, it would seem better to add a government agent that owns the
water endowments.
Figure 5 illustrates the household's utility function, as a two level maximization problem.
The lowest level combines all ﬁnal goods into an aggregator, while the top level combines
water inputs with the aggregator.
The top level maximization problem is of the following form:
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max
Wh,C
U = H
[
βW
ρ1,h
h + (1− β)Cρ1,h
] 1
ρ1,h
s.t. M ≥ pW,hWh + pCC
Wh is household water consumption, with pW,h its consumer water price. C is an aggregated
quantity of ﬁnal goods consumed, with pC its consumer price index. H is a shift parameter,
and σ1,h = 11−ρ1,h is the substitution elasticity. Note that we can re-parametrize bW = β
σ1,h
and bC = (1− β)σ1,h .
Solving the maximization problem yields the following demands and unit utility cost:
0 ≤ pW,h ⊥ Wh ≥ bW
[
PU
pW,h
]σ1,h
M
0 ≤ pC ⊥ C ≥ bC
[
PU
pC
]σ1,h
M
PU ≤ [βW (pW,h)1−σ1,h + βC (pC)1−σ1,h] 11−σ1,h ⊥ U ≥ 0
In the second-level, the aggregated goods consumed is assumed to have a Cobb-Douglas
structure with the following maximization problem,
max
Xi
C = Φ · Πzi=1 {Xγii }
s.t. I ≥
z∑
i=1
pconsY,i Xi (20)
and note that
∑z
i=1 γi = 1, I = M − pW,hWh and Φ is a shift parameter.
Solving the maximization problem yields the demand for each ﬁnal good, Xi,
0 ≤ pconsY,i ⊥ Xi ≥
γiI
pconsY,i
and pconsY,i as its consumer unit price
pC ≤ Φ · Πzi=1
{(
pconsY,i
)γi} ⊥ C ≥ 0
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B.3 Closure Rules for Balance of Payments
Economies are dynamic and can run trade imbalances at any period by buying or selling
assets. However, since this is a static model, I ﬁx the balance of payments (BOP) in all
counter-factual scenarios to the initial value. If not, it would be diﬃcult to interpret welfare
eﬀects. For example, if a policy experiment leads to an increase in the trade deﬁcit, welfare
will increase due to foreign borrowing. This is misleading because at some point, borrowing
will have to be paid back. Thus, household is assigned an endogenous endowment bopi, which
ﬁxes the trade surplus (deﬁcit) for each good to its initial value.
B.4 Market clearing conditions and secondary water market
As discussed in Section 3.1 and Appendix C, it is assumed that in the short-to-medium
run, capital Ki, is a rigid input, with a sector speciﬁc return on capital. Labor, Li, and
non-potable water, Wnp,i, are fully ﬂexible across all sectors with a uniform wage rate and
non-potable water price. The market clearing conditions are
Ls =
z∑
i=1
Li
W dnp =
z∑
i=1
Wnp,i
Ksi = K
d
i
All goods in the economy are fully consumed, either as household ﬁnal goods, as inter-
mediate inputs for production, or as exports
Yi = Xi +Nji +NXi
Secondary potable water market
Having i ∈ N ﬁrms (with j alias for i) and h ∈ H households water users, let M = N + H
be the total number of water users. As discussed in Section 2.2, and depicted in Figure 3,
each user is allocated a diﬀerent potable water quota with a diﬀerent water price. As long
as water trade is prohibited, the market clearing condition for potable water is
W si = W
d
i
W sh = W
d
h
pW,i 6= pW,j 6= pW,h
(21)
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and because water users choose the amount of water to consume, the water price of the last
unit is also the marginal water value. Each user has, therefore, a diﬀerent marginal value of
water (MVW)
MVWi 6= MVWj 6= MVWh
When a secondary water market is introduced, water inputs are transferred to those users
valuing them most. The market clears once a uniform real water price is reached. Water
users can be buyers or sellers, and having M water users leads to M2 trade conﬁgurations,
with ψmn being the relative marginal value. If user m ∈ M is a buyer, and user n ∈ M
is a seller, a possible trade channel is when MVWm
MVWn
= ψmn > 1. Otherwise, it cannot be a
possible trade channel.
MVWm
MVWn
=
ψmn > 1 possible trade channelψmn ≤ 1 not possible
These conditions, therefore, limit the number of conﬁgurations to only T = M(M−1)
2
possible
trade channels, with t ∈ T being a speciﬁc channel. (see Table 3 for a concrete example).
Thus, when water trade is enabled, the units of water, γt, that are transferred between
seller n and buyer m are obtained by
0 ≤ γt ⊥ pW,n,t − (1− ) pW,m,t ≥ 0, ∀t (22)
with pW,n,t and pW,m,t being the water market prices for the seller and buyer, respectively. For
computational purposes,  → 0 is a small number to 'help' the solver with slack activities,
thus avoiding the problem of inﬁnite solutions (a degenerate model). This insures that
when multiple t channels are opened (active), only net transfers of water is considered. For
example, a case of inﬁnite solutions is when a ﬁrst user sells to the second, the second sells
to the third, but the ﬁrst also sells to the third. By adding , the solutions is limited to
one (possible) case where, for example, the ﬁrst sells to the second and to the third, while
deactivating the second selling to the third.
There are various combinations (scenarios) of activating and deactivating water trade
channels, e.g., activating each channel separately, or all together. Therefore, each of the t ∈ T
channels has a binary action (designed by the scenario); active or not-active, {A,NA} ∈
Action. There are {tA, tNA} ∈ T channels, {iA, iNA} ∈ N ﬁrms, and {hA, hNA} ∈ H
households, that are active or not-active, respectively. In other words, a water user will not
trade because: it is either a choice, or it is blocked.
Thus, when Equation (22) is enabled, ∀tA, water units, γtA > 0, are exchanged between
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users up to a point where pW,n,t = (1− ) pW,m,t. If however, the seller's unit water price
is higher than the buyer's, pW,n,tA > (1− ) pW,m,tA (a strict inequality), the activity goes
slack, γtA = 0, i.e., there is no trade.
Enabling water trade for various water trade channels and actions, ∀i and ∀h, the market
clearance condition of Equation (21) is updated by the following
W shA +
∑
iAW
s
iA = W
d
hA +
∑
iAW
d
iA
pW,iA = pW,jA = pW,hA
W siNA = W
d
iNA
W shNA = W
d
hNA
pW,iNA 6= pW,jNA 6= pW,hNA
(23)
B.5 agricultural amenity
The representative agricultural producer, agr ∈ z, is now assumed to jointly produce two
types of goods; a privately traded commodity, Y cagr, e.g., apples, and a non-commodity,
Y ncagr, i.e. an amenity good such as landscape and heritage. Note that to clarify notation,
when the amenity is added, the agricultural output and consumer price, previously deﬁned
as Yagr, pconsY,agr, are split into two variables: Y
c
agr, p
c
Y,agr and Y
nc
agr, p
nc
Y,agr. For all other goods,
nothing has changed.
The household utility function is re-deﬁned to include the demand for both goods,
i.e., agricultural commodity and non-commodity. However, by initially setting the non-
commodity tax rate to τnc = 100%, and transferring the tax revenue directly to the house-
holds, the household pays for the commodity, but not for the non-commodity. Therefore,
the household consumes any level of amenity available, i.e., its price is zero. As long as the
tax rate on the amenity is maintained at 100%, any arbitrary amenity value used in the
benchmark data-set, has no bearing on the water trade results. It does, though, aﬀect the
level of utility.
The level of amenity is imputed by reducing the tax rate to τnc = 0, which allows
agricultural ﬁrms to internalize the amenity they produce. The model, then, searches for an
imputed amenity level that would lead to zero water trade, even when trade is possible (see
Section 5).
Assuming a ﬁxed proportion transformation function, the agricultural sector's new proﬁt-
maximization problem, which now includes both a commodity good and a non-commodity,
is:
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maximize
Yagr,Y
c
agr,Y
nc
agr
piagr = (1− τagr) pcY,agrY cagr + (1− τnc) pncagrY ncagr − pY,agrYagr
s.t. Yagr ≥ min
{
Y cagr
a
,
Y ncagr
b
}
with τagr and pY,agr deﬁned previously, as the agricultural production tax rate and the pro-
ducer price, respectively.
Solving the maximization problem leads to the following supply functions for commodity
and non-commodity goods:
0 ≤ pcagr ⊥ Y cagr ≥ aYagr
0 ≤ pncagr ⊥ Y ncagr ≥ bYagr
The zero proﬁt conditions gives the unit cost of production of the output.
p
Y,agr
≤ a · (1− τagr) pcagr + b · (1− τnc) pncagr ⊥ Yagr ≥ 0
Finally, with lack of better information, the non-commodity (the amenity) enters a Cobb-
Douglas utility function with other commodity goods in Equation 20, i.e., amenity ∈ z. The
signiﬁcance is that the substitution elasticity between the non-commodity and commodity
goods is 1. It is possible, with better information, to calibrate the substitution elasticity
by using, for example, the demand price elasticity of an amenity. Hanemann (1991), in a
related paper, discussed cases where public goods are readily substitutable for public goods,
and others where they are not. However, this is diﬃcult to ﬁnd because an amenity, being
a non-commodity, has no market price.
For the moment, it seems more likely that the substitution elasticity would probably be
less than 1, at an aggregate level. As discussed in the paper, this would mean that the
amenity value could be even larger, thus supporting even further, the main conclusions of
the paper.
C Estimating the substitution elasticities in production
Well documented water demand elasticities and output supply elasticities are used to capture
the speciﬁc characteristics of the water sector. This calibrates the substitution elasticity
between factors in the production function and utility function. Table 10 summarizes the
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Table 10: Calibrating the Substitution Elasticities, SAM 2006
Output
Supply
Elasticitya
Water
Demand
Elasticitya
Potable/Non-
Potable
Elasticityb
Cost Shares (2006, %)c Calibrated
Substitution
Elasticity
ηi W,i σ4,i θK,i θW,1,i θW,2,i θW,3,i σ1,i σ2,i σ3,i
Agricultural 0.8 -0.7 1.1 46.5 3.3 6.2 19.0 0.70 0 0.84
Manufacturing 3.0 -0.7 1.1 56.0 0.03 0.1 0.4 3.81 0 0.7
Services 3.0 -0.1 19.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.70 0 0.1
W,h θW,h σ1,h
Household -0.1 0.21 0.1
Source: a Approximate mid-values reported in various papers. b Israel Water Authority. c Cost shares are from the Social
accounting Matrix. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Israel and own calculation.
Note: Calibrating substitution elasticities is done by combining the supply and demand elasticities with the cost shares.
values used.
The time frame of the general equilibrium model aﬀects the assumptions we make on
factor mobility, and the interpretation of the results. Hertel (2002) regards a time frame of 3
to 4 years as the medium-run, which is a suﬃcient for adjustment to take place. In the short-
run, agricultural production has limited buﬀer stock, which makes it especially vulnerable
to supply shocks and leads to wide ﬂuctuations in commodity prices. In the long-run, the
importance of stock diminishes and production has time to adjust.
Land supply rigidity depends on many factors, such as the availability of suitable land,
the potential to convert land from one type of crop to another, or to another sector, i.e.,
manufacturing or services. Furthermore, the existence of legislative or policy constraints can
impede the transfer of land and make it immobile. Therefore, a lower land supply elasticity
reﬂects higher immobility. For example, in the center of Israel, former farmlands are standing
idle and ex-farmers are waiting for authorization to convert land into lucrative housing
developments or oﬃce space. This stands in contract to manufacturing and service sectors,
which have lower barriers. Thus, for the reasons above and because land is incorporated into
capital, I assign capital a sector speciﬁc input.
The ﬁrst section of Table 10 summarizes the sector speciﬁc elasticities, which will be
used to calibrate the substitution elasticities. Agricultural sectors have a relatively inelastic
supply price elasticity of 0.8, which is partly due to land's rigidity. Non-agricultural sectors
have an elastic supply price elasticity of 3.0.
To calibrate the substitution elasticities σi, consider the four level production structure
which was discussed in Section B.1 and Figure 4. In the ﬁrst level, a perfectly elastic
aggregator NWLi is combined with an immobile capital. Rutherford (2002, p.20) explains
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how to calibrate the substitution elasticity, σ1,i, when one of the inputs are immobile by
σ1,i =
ηiθK,i
1− θK,i (24)
where θK,i is the benchmark value of the cost share of capital, the ﬁxed input, obtained from
the social accounting matrix (SAM). ηi is the supply price elasticity obtained from empirical
studies.
Many empirical studies have estimated ηagr at around 0.8. See Askari and Cummings
(1977), Peterson (1988), Rao (1989) for a good review of the ﬁndings. For manufacturing
and services, a great deal of literature focus on supply price elasticities of single sectors, i.e.,
transport, housing, energy etc., but to my knowledge, there are no estimates for aggregated
levels.39 Since these sectors are generally elastic, I use a supply price elasticity of η = 3 for
both manufacturing and service sectors.
In the second level, it is common practice to aggregate intermediate inputs and sub-
aggregates in ﬁxed-proportions, σ2,i = 0.
Finally, in the third level, water and labor inputs are combined, and Appendix C.1 shows
how I calibrate the substitution elasticity σ3,i by
σ3,i =
W,i + σ2,iθW,3,i − (σ2,i − σ1,i) θW,2,i − σ1,iθW,1,i
(θW,3,i − 1) (25)
where σ1,i and σ2,i are the substitution elasticities from the upper levels. θW,1,i, θW,2,i, θW,3,i
are the water cost-shares relative to each nest, for the various sectors i, which are obtained
from the SAM. W,i is the water demand price elasticity reported in many empirical studies.
For agricultural sectors, Bernardo et al. (1987), Booker and Young (1994), Moore and Hedges
(1963), Nieswiadomy (1985), Scheierling et al. (2004) ﬁnd values for W,i ranging from -0.14
to -1. For the Israeli agriculture sector, -0.7 is an accepted ﬁgure. Eckstein (2001) estimates
Israel's agricultural demand price elasticities to be between -0.5 to -0.8, while Becker and
Lavee (2002) state it is close to -1.
For manufacturing sectors, Williams and Suh (1986) and Wang and Lall (2002) estimate
their water demand price elasticities to be between -0.7 to -1, while I use -0.7. Finally, because
the service sectors are mainly oﬃce buildings within residential areas, we calibrate them
according to surveys for residential water demand price elasticities, similar to households.
Fishelson (1994) estimates Israel's residential water demand at -0.1, while Hansen (1996),
Arbués et al. (2003), Dalhuisen et al. (2003) and others report that residential water demand
39For example, literature that report for single sectors are: Blackley (1999); Green et al. (2005); Malpezzi
and Maclennan (2001) report elastic values for the housing market, as high as 20. Dahl and Duggan (1996)
reports a supply price elasticity of 1.27 in the U.S. energy market.
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price elasticities are low, ranging between -0.1 and -0.3. I use use -0.1. Sensitivity analysis
is reported in section 4.2.
C.1 Calibrating 3rd level substitution elasticity
In order to calibrate σ3, I follow Rutherford (2002). Assume a three-level nested production
function similar to Section B.1, but use a general CES case rather than the Leontief structure
in the second nest, and with the fourth nest aggregated into the third. If we construct the
cost function from a calibrated benchmark in which input prices and total cost are unity, we
can scale the benchmark values of the sub-aggregate cost as unity and express the demand
for water as:
W = [pW ]
−σ3 pσ3−σ2WL p
σ2−σ1
NWL [pY ]
σ1 W¯
The derivative of the the demand for water with respect to the input price of water, at
the initial allocation point where all prices are unity is:
∂W
∂pW
|p=1=
[
−σ3 + (σ3 − σ2) ∂pWL
∂pW
+ (σ2 − σ1) ∂pNWL
∂pW
+ σ1
∂pY
∂pW
]
W¯
By Shephard's Lemma the derivative of the unit cost function with respect to input prices
will give the share of inputs at the benchmark calibration, where X¯ indicates values at the
benchmark.
∂pWL
∂pW
=
pW W¯
pW W¯ + pLL¯
= θW,3
∂pNWL
∂pW
=
pW W¯
pW W¯ + pLL¯+ pNN¯
= θW,2
∂pY
∂pW
=
pW W¯
pW W¯ + pLL¯+ pNN¯ + pKK¯
=
pW W¯
pY Y¯
= θW,1
thus,
∂W
∂pW
|p=1= [−σ3 + (σ3 − σ2) θW,3 + (σ2 − σ1) θW,2 + σ1θW,1] W¯
The elasticity of demand is deﬁned as W |p=1= ∂W∂pW
pW
W¯
and therefore
W |p=1= [−σ3 + (σ3 − σ2) θW,3 + (σ2 − σ1) θW,2 + σ1θW,1]
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Finally, solving for for σ3 yields:
σ3 =
W + σ2θW,3 − (σ2 − σ1) θW,2 − σ1θW,1
(θW,3 − 1)
D Estimating the substitution elasticities in utility
Appendix B.2 discusses the household's utility structure. Using water demand price elastici-
ties, w,h, I calibrate the household's substitution elasticity, σ1,h, with the following equation:
σ1,h =
w,h
θw,h − 1 (26)
The cost share of water, θw,h, is obtained from the SAM. Household water demand price
elasticity, w,h, is estimated at 0.1, as I did for service sectors. Interestingly, because the
water cost share is nearly zero, the substitution elasticity equals minus the demand elasticity
of water (see right hand side of Table 10). Finally, in the second level, ﬁnal goods are
aggregated using a Cobb-Douglas function with σ2,h = 1, which is standard practice in many
applied general equilibrium models.
D.1 Calibrating Household's 1st Level Substitution Elasticity
Similar to Section C.1, I calibrate the household's substitution elasticity using water demand
price elasticities. At the calibrated benchmark, in which input prices and total expenditure
are unity, we can scale the benchmark values of the sub-aggregate expenditure as unity and
express the demand for household water as:
Wh = W¯hp
−σ1,h
W,h p
σ1,h
U
where pU is deﬁned as the expenditure function for a unit utility.
Diﬀerentiate the above with respect to household water expenditure, obtain:
∂Wh
∂pW,h
= W¯h
[
−σ1,hp−σ1,h−1W,h + σ1,hpσ1,h−1U
∂pU
∂pW,h
]
(27)
Again by Shephard's Lemma, the derivative of the unit expenditure function with respect
to input prices will give the share of inputs at the benchmark calibration.
∂pU
∂pW,h
=
pW,hW¯h
pW,hW¯h + pCC¯
= θW,h
Recalling that all prices are unity at benchmark, rearrange 27 as:
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∂Wh
∂pW,h
|p=1 = W¯h [−σ1,h + σ1,hθW,h]
Finally, deﬁning the own-price elasticity of household water demand as W,h and solving
for σ1,h, obtain:
σ1,h =
W,h
θW,h − 1 (28)
E Data Collection and Building the SAM
This section will brieﬂy summarize the data collection process and assumptions made in the
calibration of the model.
E.1 Social accounting Matrix
Careful attention was placed on the construction of the social accounting matrix (SAM),
which are based on Use and Supply tables published by the Israeli central bureau of statistics
(CBS). It must be mentioned that the Use and Supply tables for years 2000, 2004, 2005,
2006 were reported in purchaser prices and aggregates matched. However, data for 1995
were not directly comparable, because Use data was reported in current output prices, while
Supply data was reported in purchaser's prices. As a result, aggregates do not match, and
additional assumptions had to be made in order to balance the SAM. Double checking the
weights of inputs in production with later years, I believe that the 1995 SAM is good enough
for comparison with the other years.
Water expenditure for each sector is estimated via other means, and not directly through
the Use-Supply tables. This is because CBS does not report water separately from the
electricity sector for two reason. First, due to national security reasons, they do not reveal
sources and dependents. Second, electricity consumption is the largest input into water
production, and it is natural for CBS to aggregate them together. As Plaut (2000) reports,
electricity is approximately 28% of Mekorot's input costs, which amounts to approximately
6% of Israel's total electricity consumption.40
The water authority publishes potable and non-potable water consumption for agricul-
tural and manufacturing use, and residential use, i.e., services and household. Residential
use is reported, for eleven sub-groups: housing, education, sport, public gardens, public
buildings, health, hotels, commerce and trade, security and transport, construction, and
service. Data for 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006 and for 1995, the weights from 1996 were used.
40This high energy requirement is due to having water pumped from the sea of Galilee, an elevation of
about 210 meters below sea level to an elevation of 152 meter above sea level into the national water carrier,
from which gravity continues to transports the rest towards the center of Israel.
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Thus, water expenditure in households and service sector is the sum water quantity times
the relevant tariﬀ band, as reported by the Water Authority. Agricultural water expenditure
is obtained by multiplying the quantity of total potable water supply by the ﬁrst price block.
Likewise for manufacturing, the quantity of water is multiplied by the main water tariﬀ block.
Finally, Labor inputs are obtained from CBS' Compensation of Employees by Industry tables.
E.2 Water Consumption by User and Water Prices
Water price data was received from the water authority from Jan 1996 until December
2009. Prices update according to changes in the water-index, which is based on changes to
the consumer price index, electricity prices and average wage levels, or as an administrative
decision with governmental approval. In order to obtain a yearly water price, I simply average
prices if they were changed more than once during the year. Water prices are calculated by
the cost of extraction, and additional cost that are supposed to capture distribution and
environmental sustainability.
Water Authority uses a complex increasing block tariﬀ (IBT) for each type of consumer.
As Table 11 illustrates, agricultural sectors pay a diﬀerent price from the residential users,
with a diﬀerent IBT structure. Within residential users, diﬀerent price are also charged.
The water authority has changed its pricing structure in 2010, aiming to have similar water
pricing for all users (See Water-Authority (2010)).
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Table 11: Water Price by User (Yearly Average)a
Year Quantity 1996 2000 2004 2005 2006 2009
Household First 8 CM 2.32 2.69 3.19 3.31 3.52 4.17
Next 7 CM 3.42 3.99 4.49 4.61 4.85 5.75
Any additional CM 4.97 5.78 6.28 6.40 6.69 7.93
Hospitals and Mikve 3.68 4.28 2.26 2.38 3.43 2.77
Hotels 1.27 1.69 2.19 2.30 2.48 4.23
Public Buildings, Stores,
Business, etc.
3.68 4.28 4.78 4.90 5.15 6.04
Public Gardens 4.97 5.78 6.28 6.40 6.69 7.68
Manufacturing (Potable) In allocation limits 1.10 1.60 2.28 2.48 2.49 3.19
Excess Up to 10% over allocation 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Excess Above 10% over allocation 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Agriculture (Potable) Quantity A 0.78 0.94 1.31 1.46 1.48 1.63
Quantity B 0.89 1.08 1.54 1.69 1.70 1.87
Quantity C 1.11 1.38 1.98 2.13 2.15 2.36
Excess Up to 10% over allocation 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Excess Above 10% over allocation 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Recycled (Shafdan) 0.52 0.62 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.86
Euents 0.38 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.64
Source: Israeli Water Authority
a
In 2010, the price bands were changed. However, since the model's data covers until 2006, I do not investigate the eﬀects of
this new price band.
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